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The Rise of Judicially Enforced Economic, Social
& Cultural Rights—
Refocusing Perspectives
Salma Yusuf
ABSTRACT
There is little disagreement that the past two decades have been
characterized by a rise in the judicial enforcement of economic, social and
cultural rights (ESCRs) in several regions of the world. As a result, there has
been a tendency to assume that the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs and
the attendant judicial role has been settled once and for all. However, this
article demonstrates that an abandonment of the debate altogether would be
fallacious. While acknowledging that the conventional concerns surrounding
the debate have been considerably thwarted, this article proposes the need for a
shift in focus to new issues that have surfaced in recent times. The emergence
of a “changed landscape” for the judicial enforcement of ESCRs has arisen as a
consequence of the development of a set of phenomena that will be outlined in
this article. This article also argues that because this set of phenomena has a
direct bearing on the judicial enforcement of ESCRs, each of the phenomena
goes to the heart of the debate on the judicial role in such situations. Further,
this article makes a case for revisiting the judicial role in the wake of this
“changed landscape,” a task that becomes not only inevitable, but necessary as
well. Finally, this article engages in a reconsideration of the judicial role in this
changed context.

INTRODUCTION
It is incorrect to contend that the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs is
fading away. Equally flawed is the assertion that the focus of the debate has
remained stagnant. In fact, two legal systems in particular stand out for being
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activist and progressive in this field: those of South Africa and India. What is
required, therefore, is a clarification of both positions.
Prior to the 1990s, the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs was primarily a
theoretical one, based for the most part on mere speculation and pure
conjecture.1 Today, however, it has become apparent that the era of
justiciability of ESCRs has taken on real practical meaning2 and has taken root
in domestic legal systems in several regions of the world.3 The debate has thus,
“moved on to the point where the wisdom of allowing judges the power to
enforce social rights is no longer seriously questioned,”4 but rather to a place,
as this article argues, where there is growing recognition of a need for judges
to step in so as to give full meaning to the realization of these rights.5 Hence,
what is required is not an abandonment of the debate on the justiciability of
these rights, but rather a shift to a new set of questions that beg our attention.
At the outset, this article raises the question as to whether, and to what
extent, the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs has been settled. Further, this
article argues that analogous to the rise of judicially enforced ESCRs, the
development of a set of phenomena is also on a rise. These phenomena include
the emergence of a new constitutional order, as well as transnational judicial
conversations, institutional conversations, the judicialization of politics, and
the growing campaign arguing that freedom from poverty be considered a legal
right. While these phenomena may be viewed as occurring parallel to the rise
1

ROBERTO GARGARELLA, COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? 255 (2006).
2
See generally JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS (Tony Solomonides & Bertrand G. Ramcharan eds., 2005)
[hereinafter JUDICIAL PROTECTION]
3
Id.; GARGARELLA, supra note 1, at 255.
4
GARGARELLA, supra note 1, at 255.
5
S. Muralidhar, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An Indian Response to the
Justiciability Debate, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS 23 (Yash P. Ghai & Jill
Cottrell eds., 2004) (“[T]he question to be asked is probably not whether the court should
intervene or is capable of intervening but whether judicial intervention will enable the
progressive realization of ESCRs”).
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in judicial enforcement of ESCRs, this article demonstrates that they are
actually part of the cause of this type of enforcement.
Further, this intersectionality has refashioned the backdrop in which the
debate has hitherto been located, and thus calls for re-examination. This article
will not explore each of these phenomena in its entirety, but will instead
explore some of the facets that might be considered relevant for this
discussion. This article will then demonstrate that the altered setting of the
debate on justiciability has led to the need to re-conceptualize the judicial role
in terms of the enforcement of ESCRs. This article will explore how the
current phenomena are refashioning the backdrop of the discussion on the role
of the judiciary in enforcing ESCRs. It becomes evident that the setting is
altered to such a significant extent as to warrant special, continued
consideration. The article seeks to provide the basis and serve as a catalyst for
future exploration of the subject.
There is, however, a caveat to the article’s goal, as it does not intend to
imply that the phenomena dealt with herein are either exhaustive or
comprehensive. Its primary purpose is to flag the need to constantly rethink
and revisit the debate on justiciability with fresh perspectives in the wake of
constantly emerging developments, as they might prove to be crucial to the
perception of the judicial role.
The article also serves to illustrate the point that this debate is not static;
instead, it is constantly evolving. This evolution demands vigilance in
watching varying influences in the future. One might imagine a slight hint of
this resonating within the work of writers who argue that “[t]he variable nature
of the concept of justiciability, depending on the nature of the issue sought to
be adjudicated upon as well as on the constitutional role envisaged for the
court, defies formulation of precise standards to control judicial functioning in
the area.”6 This statement seems to refer to “external influences” apart from the
6

MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 28 (1995).
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inherent nature of the judicial system itself such as the type of issue before the
court or the constitutional provisions prescribed. The present discussion
utilizes this vein of thinking and seeks to build upon it by making a case for the
inclusion of other external but relevant phenomena such as those listed above.
Such influences impact the context in which the debate on justiciability ought
to be viewed.
Within the larger discussion of the implementation of ESCRs, this article
does not intend to suggest that the judiciary be considered a panacea to the
economic, social, and cultural ills suffered by disadvantaged and marginalized
sections of society, but rather wishes to extend a more tempered, realistic
proposition that judges can play a crucial role in the entire process.7 Hence, it
contributes to an overarching view that the role of the judiciary in the
enforcement of these rights must not be ignored or trivialized.
The call for continuing the debate is frequently dismissed because critics say
that there is an over-emphasis on the legal aspect8 and a detraction from what
actually warrants attention.9 However, a continued engagement in the debate is
justified on the basis of the need for, and benefits of, a “narrow focus” on
justiciability. This narrow focus would be one that “helps to reveal the nature
of ESCRs and its differences, if any, from civil and political rights, the
modalities of enforcement of ESCRs, and the articulation of court with other
agencies for their protection and enforcement, all of which help to uncover the
specificity of the judicial role.”10
There are three main objections that have been advanced in relation to the
justiciability of ESCRs. First, there is the purported distinction between
7

Dennis M. Davis, Socioeconomic rights: Do they deliver the goods?, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L.
687 (2008); COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks
eds., 2008). See generally GARGARELLA, supra note 1. For an assessment of impact on
society at large, see Muralidhar, supra note 5.
8
HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT LAW POLITICS
AND MORALS 298 (1996).
9
Muralidhar, supra note 5, at 23.
10
Id.

NEW PERSPECTIVES

The Rise of Judicially Enforced Economic, Social & Cultural Rights 757

economic, social, and cultural rights on the one hand, and civil and political
rights on the other. Second, there are two legitimacy concerns, namely that it
offends democratic principles and violates the constitutional doctrine of the
separation of powers. Third, there is a fear that judges do not have the
capability to deal with polycentric issues that have implications for budgetary
and policy decisions that are considered to be the prerogative of the executive
arm of government.
This article will examine the validity of these objections, both separately and
together, with their respective counter-arguments. It begins with an
examination of the latter two objections, which have been the most contentious
of the three. Any discussion leading to the consideration of the judicial role in
the enforcement of ESCRs would, naturally, be aborted if the questions from
the skeptics have not been dealt with and, hence, becomes crucial to the overall
debate. Further, as most debates on the judicial role are inextricably linked to
these objections, it becomes necessary to examine the objections, at least
briefly, before moving to the next question.
The second part of the article proposes that the emergence of “a changed
landscape” has created a new context for consideration in the debate on the
justiciability of ESCRs.
In the third part, the article moves on to a reconsideration of the judicial role
in the enforcement of ESCRs in the wake of the proposed changed context. It
does so by drawing on the discussion and arguments made in the preceding
sections of the article while focusing on three particular aspects of the judicial
role: 1) interpretation of the meaning of ESCRs; 2) judicial review of executive
action; and 3) the provision of remedies. The limitations inherent in the
judicial role in the enforcement of ESCRs, though not the main focus of the
debate, will be flagged at relevant instances.
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PART 1: JUSTICIABILITY—DEFYING THE SKEPTICS
A. Concerns of Legitimacy
1. Violation of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers
The legitimacy concerns raised in connection with the judicial enforcement
of ESCRs emanate from two sources. First, some claim that judicial
enforcement of ESCRs encroaches into the legislative domain, thereby
usurping the prerogative over decisions on matters involving budgetary
implications; hence, judicial intervention in this area results in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.11
A more logical and commonsensical approach, however, would be to argue
for a “balance of power,” which must be “maintained by judgments of political
morality rather than formal accounts of the separation of powers.”12 But judges
appear to be well aware of the potential danger of breaching the doctrine of
separation of powers when enforcing ESCRs.13 This has been illustrated in
cases such as Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp,14 where the Supreme Court of
India went only so far as to require that the government serve notice before
removing pavement hawkers, but not to the point of prescribing that the
government make houses available for all of its citizens. This ruling is
significant because it demonstrates how the Indian Supreme Court went only
11

Marius Pieterse, Coming to terms with Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights, 20 S. AFR.
J. HUM. RTS. 383, 386–391 (2004). See Cecile Fabre, Constitutionalizing Social Rights, 6 J.
POL. PHIL. 263 (1998) [hereinafter Fabre, Constitutionalizing]; Craig Scott & Patrick
Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?: Social Rights in a New
South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1992).
12
Trever R. S. Allan, Constitutional Dialogue and the Justification of Judicial Review, 23
OXFORD. J. LEGAL STUD. 563, 584 (2003) [hereinafter Allan, Constitutional Dialogue]. See
also Geraldine van Bueren, Including the Excluded: The Case for an Economic, Social and
Cultural Human Rights Act, X PUB. L. 456 (2002).
13
Jheelan Navish, The Enforceability of Socio-economic Rights, 12 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
146, 146–57 (2007).
14
Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., [1986] A.I.R. 18. (India) (exploring the idea of housing as
a social right in the case of hawkers, who, when removed from their place of abode, were
denied the right to housing).
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so far as to require that the government inform citizens when it was
implementing a policy and did not go so far as to prescribe what course of
action the government ought to take in making redress.15 Likewise, a similar
awareness was displayed in the judgment of Soobramoney v. Minister of
Health, Kwazulu-Natal,16 where the Constitutional Court of South Africa noted
its reluctance “to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the
political organs . . . whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters.”17
Such examples, however, might be neutralized by skeptics who cite other
cases and allege that judges have “gone too far.” But it is indeed possible to
enforce such rights without violating the doctrine of separation of powers. 18
This argument is not weakened by the mere fact that some judges have not
been practicing this enforcement. The judiciary is capable of acting with
responsibility and fairness in protecting the rights of victims while not
violating the notion of separation of powers. Further, this argument provides
examples of the awareness that judges are capable of exercising as they seek to
maintain sensitive balances by being activist and creative at the same time.
Further, as in the case of Simla,19 we can once again observe the value of
judicial involvement in enforcing ESCRs. In that case, the Indian Supreme
Court sought to rectify the ‘mandate creep,’ the lower court had gone beyond
what it was mandated to do. Through the hierarchical structure of the courts,
the inherent institutional ability for higher courts to correct “wrong” decisions
in lower courts becomes evident. This basic feature of hierarchy and appeals in
the judicial system neatly contributes to maintaining efficiency and credibility
of the judiciary when it seeks to enforce ESCRs. In other words, the efficacy of
15

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., [1985] S.C.R. 51 (India).
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal, 12 B.C.L.R. 1696 (1997) (S. Afr.).
17
Id.
18
See, e.g., Bermudez v. Minister of Health and Social Assistance Supreme Court of Justice,
Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela, Case No. 15.789, Decision No. 918, at 916 (July 15,
1999); Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of a Student of Med. College (Simla), 1985 A.I.R. 910,
1985 SCR (3) 676 (India).
19
Simla, 1985 A.I.R. 910.
16
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an appeals system functions as a safeguard in the judicial process, and it
applies equally to the adjudication of all legal cases, and ESCRs are no
exception. Below, this article will demonstrate the weakness in skeptics’
arguments that there is an overly expansive application of power in emerging
phenomena such as the principle of constitutional dialogue.
2. The Democratic Objection
The second concern frequently voiced over legitimacy springs from the
claim that it is “counter-majoritarian,” in that judicial enforcement of ESCRs
takes away from the elected members of government and transfers to the
judiciary, an unelected body, the task of making challenging decisions on
competing claims regarding resource allocation. The decisions are usually
challenging, as they require choices to be made between purposes for which
the same resource base is important. This task, some believe, is best left to the
elected branches of the state that are either directly or indirectly accountable to
the public.20
While admitting that these are indeed difficult choices to make, adjudicating
on negative rights is just as difficult.21 Civil and political rights are referred to
as ‘negative rights’ while ESCRs are referred to as ‘positive rights’ because the
former requires, in most cases, that the state not interfere or obstruct the
realization of rights, whereas the latter generally requires proactive measures
on the part of the state.22 If adjudication on negative rights is legitimized on the
20

Scott & Macklem, supra note 11, at 17; CECILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION: GOVERNMENT AND THE DECENT LIFE 183 (2000) [hereinafter FABRE,
SOCIAL RIGHTS]; Pieterse, supra note 11, at 10–12; David Wiseman, The Charter and
Poverty: Beyond Injusticiability, 51 U. TORONTO L.J. 425, 443 (2001).
21
See FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 176.
22
See, e.g., Government of South Africa v. Grootboom (Grootboom), 11B.C.L.R. 1169 at
[34] (2000) (holding that “there is at the very least a negative obligation placed upon the
state and all other entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right of
access to adequate housing); Airey v. Ireland 2 E.H.R.R. 305 (1979) (finding that the state
had a positive duty in relation to a right to a fair trial where legal aid was deemed applicable
to civil cases). See generally The Enforceability of Socio-Economic Rights, EUROPEAN
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basis that such rights are imperative to the protection of autonomy, so might a
similar view be advanced with regards to ESCRs.23 In order for the autonomy
of the citizenry to be protected, the well-being and welfare of the populace
must also be protected. For example, when basic needs such as health care and
housing are not met, the individual will not be able to exercise autonomy
through an enjoyment of, among others, rights such as the freedom of
expression and association. Hence, for meaningful fulfillment of civil and
political rights, the realization of ESCRs becomes sine qua non.24
Do such responses then suggest that the judiciary operates in a vacuum,
insulated from any accountability?25 This is certainly not the case. Various
measures of accountability exist, including: transparency facilitated by public
observation of hearings; the requirement of judges to explain and justify their
decisions; the appointment of judges through a formal, credible process; and
utilization of the doctrine of binding precedent.26
Moreover, this concern reflects what some contend are varying definitions
of the concept of democracy. “The crowning proof of democracy in our times
is the growing acceptance and enforcement of the idea that democracy is not
the same thing as majority rule; in a real democracy minorities possess legal
protections in the form of a written constitution, which even a democratically
elected assembly cannot change.”27 Because minorities are most vulnerable to
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW (2007) (arguing that socioeconomic rights can be expressed
either positively or negatively).
23

Id.
Id.
25
See, e.g., Rajeev Dhavan, Judges and Accountability, in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL
POWER (R. Dhavan et al. eds., 1985).
26
Pieterse, supra note 11, at 10–15; Alon Harel, Rights based Judicial Review: A
Democratic Justification, 22 L. & PHIL. 247, 258 (2003).
27
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 1–2 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004). See also GARGARELLA, supra
note 1, at 13–14 (attempting to propose a model that is neither conservative (based on
Alexander Hamilton and Justice Marshall) nor the progressive view of those like Michael
Walzer, but rather one that is better suited to judicial enforcement by drawing on E. Goodin’s
theory of deliberative democracy); Pieterse, supra note 11, at 11 (noting that “judicial review
24
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violations of their ESCRs, legal protection and the subsequent judicial
enforcement can go a long way in effectuating their rights. Thus, one might
argue that judicial review fulfills rather than frustrates the notion of democracy
through the protection of minority groups that lack political power and voice.28
Furthermore, the judiciary fulfills accountability by arriving at reasoned
decisions.29 Moreover, the judicial function can be defended on account of the
fact that it serves as a guardian of a process that provides space for the
democratic participation of citizens to challenge injustices that have resulted
from a violation of rights, as opposed to being seen as an institution which
makes substantive decisions concerning the lives of members of the public.30
Finally, the growing trends of, inter alia, transnational judicial
conversations, the “constitutionalization” of ESCRs, and the process of
constitutional dialogue have all further strengthened the legitimacy of a
judicial role in the realization of ESCRs (see infra Part II).
B. Concerns of Competence
Concerns over judicial competence in adjudicating ESCRs have been
expressed at several levels. Among others, the primary claim is that the
judiciary is ill-equipped and lacks the technical know-how to: first, make
decisions that have government budgetary implications and involve resource
allocations;31 second, to take decisions that involve competing policy
choices;32 third, that it lacks tools to discern violations of ESCRs; and33 fourth,
maybe justified where the benefits that are gained outweigh the derogation from direct
democracy” and that this would provide a voice for the poor and be a shield from what
Ronald Dworkin described as the “tyranny of the majority.”).
28
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1980).
29
See Dhavan, supra note 25.
30
See id.
31
Cecile Fabre, Constitutionalising Social Rights, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 263, 280 (1998).
32
Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8
S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 464, 464–74 (1992); Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-economic Rights in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA (Mathew Chaskalson et al. eds., 1999).
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that courts do not have the “systematic overview of government policy” and
are thus ill-suited to create and enforce government programs.34
Several responses to these concerns could significantly weaken the
arguments. For example, a suggested solution could be to have the judges
trained in the necessary specialist skills and enable consultation with
independent experts such as medical practitioners, educators, or social
scientists who would help to better frame the factual matter before the court.35
Furthermore, judicial preview of the law and group action, albeit a weaker
protection of constitutional rights requiring a “minimum” of housing, health
care, inter alia, to be afforded by the government is a possible way to retain
the values of constitutionalization while circumventing the difficulty facing the
judiciary in deciding violations of individual claims.36 Judicial preview dictates
that a matter is considered by the court not after a violation of a person’s rights
has occurred, but rather before the matter arises in court—thereby covering all
persons or groups entitled to the right. It is a proactive measure and
necessitates an activist, creative, and innovative approach by the judiciary—by
contrast to the process of judicial review, whereby the court plays its
traditional responsive role and considers the aspect of a person’s right only
after the violation has occurred. This form of judicial action retains the values
of constitutionalization because it upholds the ‘minimum core’ requirement
referred to in the preceding discussion and avoids the danger of compromise
that comes with judicial review.Some might contend, however, that the alleged
concerns over judicial capacity mask even deeper concerns. The skepticism
surrounding judicial enforcement of ESCRs seemingly has more to do with
33

Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST
APPLICATION 225 (Andras Sajo ed., 1996).
34
Id.
35
Id. See G.L. Peiris, Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Subcontinent: Current
Dimensions, 40 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 66 (1991). See, e.g., Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
986 Supp. S.C.C. 596 (1985) (India). See also Barse v. Union of India, 3 S.C.C. 596 (1986)
(India) (stating that a wide mandate was given to an independent commission so as to enable
maximum cooperation of all jails in their investigations); Navish, supra note 13.
36
See generally JUDICIAL PROTECTION, supra note 2; GARGARELLA, supra note 1.
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ideological concerns.37 Further, without legitimacy, the judiciary would be
deterred from “tak[ing] the first steps”38 in building expertise that could lead to
an enhancement of its capacity for adjudicating issues involving ESCRs.39
While these arguments appear reasonable, they do not directly respond to the
concerns of competence raised supra part B. They must not be dismissed,
however, as they strengthen the “direct” responses to the concerns raised.
Furthermore, skeptics raise another serious concern: the “polycentric”40
nature of disputes that is characteristic of ESCRs cases. Some believe that the
reason for this lies in the nature of the character of the litigation framework,41
where “certain kinds of human relations are not appropriate raw material for a
process of decision that is institutionally committed to acting on the basis of
reasoned argument.”42 The fact that dispute adjudication is subject to
adversarial proceedings that do not adapt well to decision making on
polycentric issues43—and how all persons are likely to be affected—cannot be
gathered before the court.44 These concerns have been allayed by new, creative
judicial models in countries like India, where the Supreme Court has
developed the model of Public Interest Litigation and Special Commissions;45
the former model of judicial preview creates an enabling environment for
consideration of the implications of decisions beyond parties appearing before
the court, and the latter model facilites an inquisitorial-type of judicial
37

See JUDICIAL PROTECTION, supra note 2; GARGARELLA, supra note 1.
Scott & Macklem, supra note 11, at 25.
39
Id.
40
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394 (1978).
See also Liebenberg, supra note 32.
41
Pieterse, supra note 11, at 12–14.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 561, 574–75 (1985); Pieris, supra note 35. See generally
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS (Benedetto Conforti &
Francesco Francioni eds., 1997) (exploring ways in which domestic courts are dealing with
international human rights issues).
38
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proceedings. Though the desirability of each of these methods is not without
challenge,46 the point being made here is that if the judiciary has to, it is
capable of adopting such creative models in new situations as the need arises.
The concern regarding polycentricity requires a response. First, “the
pervasiveness of polycentricity”47 has been widely accepted48 as relevant to all
disputes, including those involving civil and political rights.49 Second, since
this criticism goes to the root of the nature of the dispute and not to the nature
of the adjudicating body; it does not mean that the executive branch or the
legislative branch are in a better position to make such decisions when
compared to the judiciary.50 Third, despite Fuller’s assertion that contrary
evidence does not weaken his theory, there is increasing resistance to such a
view.51 Perhaps what is required then is a “more sophisticated analysis of
judicial competence”52 as adopted in the United States, or, alternatively,
“refining the doctrine to render it more consistent with the role of courts in
contemporary society”53 before further reliance is placed on this theory as a
means to justify a restrained attitude for the judiciary.54
C. Final Thoughts
The first part of the article has examined two of the main criticisms leveled
against the justiciability of ESCRs by deconstructing several facets that each
embraces. It has demonstrated that such objections no longer stand up in the
46

Surya Deva, Public Interest Litigation in India: a critical review, 28 CIV. JUST. Q. 19, 7–
10 (2009).
47
Jeff A. King, The Pervasiveness of Polycentricity, Pub. L. 101–124 (2008).
48
Id.; Pieterse, supra note 11, at 12–14. See generally Dennis M. Davis, The case against
the inclusion of Socio-economic demands in a Bill of Rights as Directive Principles, 8 S.
AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 475 (1992).
49
Pieterse, supra note 11, at 12–14.
50
Id..
51
See King, supra note 47 (noting that Lon Fuller is a theorist on polycentricity and arguing
that his doctrine should be refined or rejected).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
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face of the many recent developments and persuasive counterarguments
explored. Taking the debate one step further, this article suggests that the
development of new phenomena has a double bearing on the debate of
justiciability: first, by having a chilling effect on the objections to ESCRs and
thereby further weakening the skeptics’ case, and second, by contributing to a
“changed landscape” for the judicial enforcement of ESCRs. This is not to
suggest that a new landscape displaces the former, but rather that it alters the
backdrop within which the debate has hitherto been located.

PART 2: A CHANGED LANDSCAPE FOR THE JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT OF ESCRS—IDENTIFYING CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
A. A New Constitutional Order
A recent and growing trend in many states has been the incorporation of
ESCRs into national constitutions. This trend saw a related growth in the
enforcement of ESCRs, both in national jurisdictions and regional systems.
The trend experienced “an astonishingly rapid transition to what may be called
‘juristocracy,’ . . . where constitutional reform has transferred an
unprecedented amount of power from representative institutions to
judiciaries.”55 The emergence of this new constitutional approach, however,
has manifested itself in three distinct traditions. First, that ESCRs are purely
aspirational and should not be included as concrete constitutional provisions;
second, that they should be embodied in the constitution but with a limited,
conservative function of being non-justiciable guiding principles of state
policy; and third, the more progressive approach of being incorporated as
specific rights capable of judicial adjudication.56
55

HIRSCHL, supra note 27, at 1.
See generally Albie Sachs, The Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights: The
Grootboom Case, in DEMOCRATISING DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 131 (Peris Jones & Kristian Stokke eds., 2005).
56
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While academics strenuously contest the desirability of incorporating
ESCRs into constitutions, 57 judicial review may be seen to promote rather than
offend the notion of democracy through the protection of politically powerless
groups.58 It gives a voice to the voiceless so that when their ESCRs have been
violated, they can bring their grievances to court; they have an avenue to
address their grievances, and the judiciary fills a void by empowering them.
The desirability of including ESCRs in constitutional documents also varies
with geopolitical context. In the West, this might not be problematic or
harmful. In the East, conversely, constitutionalization of ESCRs “is a large
mistake, possibly a disaster” because the countries are transitioning from
communism to a market economy.59 Transition states are undergoing changes
structurally and substantively, and many will seek to change or enact new
constitutions that keep with the ideologies towards which they aspire. Further,
the exclusion of these rights from a nation’s constitution shuts out the
possibility of judicial efforts to rectify structural social, economic, and cultural
inequalities, particularly in hesitant and timid judicial cultures. On the other
hand, non-inclusion of rights might not deter an activist judiciary from
initiating or challenging action on behalf of marginalized individuals or
groups. Nevertheless, the incorporation of such rights in constitutions as
directive principles of state policy as enforceable rights adds legitimacy to
judiciaries that aim to enforce them.
57

Frank I. Michelman, Socio-Economic rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America
Away, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 663, 3–6 (2008) (discussing whether non-inclusion in actual fact
makes a difference in the American context given the welfare obligations and undertakings
of the government. Further, it looks at reasons why such rights should or should not be
included in the U.S. Constitution). See generally Sunstein, supra note 33; FABRE, SOCIAL
RIGHTS, supra note 20; Nicholas Haysom, Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and
Socio-Economic Rights, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 451 (1992); Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a
Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 464
(1992); HIRSCHL, supra note 27; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT
CONSTITUTIONS DO 222 (2001).
58
Scott & Macklem, supra note 11, at 137.
59
Sunstein, supra note 33, at 225.
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Skeptics are concerned that constitutionalization of ESCRs detracts attention
from the main purpose of a constitution: to protect civil liberties and regulate
between the different branches of government. When citizens assert their
rights, the corresponding obligations of the state are engaged (i.e. to protect
civil and political liberties), and thereby citizens are protected from
oppression.60 An oppressive government typically denies people their liberties
of free speech and movement. It takes steps to prevent the depressing
eventuality where people have their civil liberties protected, but their basic
needs are unmet—therefore preventing them from enjoying the former.61
A closely related phenomenon to the constitutionalization of social rights is
the “judicialization of politics.” This concept has been described as the
infusion of judicial decision-making and of court-like procedures into new
political arenas.62 The constitutionalization of ESCRs is also said to have
political consequences through what has been termed the “global expansion of
judicial power.”63 This phenomenon too does not escape the discussion on
judicial involvement in ESCRs, but contributes to the changing landscape in
the judicial enforcement of ESCRs.64 For better or for worse, the expansion of
judicial power will shape global politics and policy for the foreseeable future.
Recent practice, some argue, shows a movement toward government by the
judiciary—where the judicial arm of the state governs and seems to hold the
greatest decision-making power—as opposed to total majoritarianism—where
a numerical majority in parliament or the executive make decisions for the
entire country with all its peoples.65 Notwithstanding the normative
justifications advanced for or against the incorporation of ESCRs into national
60

Id. at 222.
Id.
62
TORBJÖRN VALLINDER, THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 515–16 (C. Neal
Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1997).
63
Id. See generally HIRSCHL, supra note 27, at 31 (discussing of the impacts and effects on
democratic rule as a result of this trend which has been set afoot by the incorporation of such
rights in the Constitution).
64
See VALLINDER, supra note 62.
65
Id.
61

NEW PERSPECTIVES

The Rise of Judicially Enforced Economic, Social & Cultural Rights 769

constitutions, this phenomenon affects judicial power and alters the landscape
for the debate on the judicial enforcement of ESCRs. 66
“The belief that judicially affirmed rights are a force of social change
removed from the constraints of political power has attained near sacred status
in public discussion.”67 Thus, the new constitutional order that embraces the
constitutionalization of ESCRs has shifted the debate from the traditional
concerns of whether ESCRs ought to be the subject of judicial adjudication to
what extent the judiciary should be empowered to intervene.
B. Transnational Judicial Conversations
Transnational judicial conversations signal new possibilities for the
judiciary’s ability to enforce ESCRs. The conversations provide an additional
avenue of enrichment for the “judicial project” by creating a channel for the
exchange and sharing of its judicial knowledge and expertise, skills, and
substantive jurisprudence. Transnational judicial conversations have been
described as “worldwide dialogue”68 where the “courts are talking to one
another all over the world.”69 Their relevance and prospects for the future only
signal an increase in momentum, one in which soon “no lawyer will be able to
advise a client on any matter which might involve a public authority without
studying not just the European jurisprudence, . . . but also American case law,
Canadian case law, and even Indian case law and Australian and New Zealand
case law.”70
66

See generally HIRSCHL, supra note 27.
Id. at 1.
68
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
214 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000).
69
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV.
99, 99 (1994)
70
Lord Scarman, Human Rights Bill, 582 HL Debs. 1268 (Nov. 1997), available at
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1997/nov/03/human-rights-bill-hl.
67
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Not surprisingly, however, this phenomenon elicits concerns, both in terms
of trend and appropriateness.71 For instance, some have expressed concern
about the superimposition of the United States and British reasoning into
Indian courts, which are very different from each other.72 While
acknowledging the logic expressed in this view, however, this practice should
not be abandoned completely on this ground alone, as there are nations that do
in fact share similar, comparable realities.73 The occasion when the practice
does not suit the comparable realities of another jurisdiction and context
simply does not justify a wholesale abandonment of the practice.
International human rights and legal scholars like Geraldine van Bueren
argue that the lack of jurisprudence in the international sphere could be cited as
one of the reasons for the absence of rich and robust jurisprudence on ESCRs
in domestic legal systems.74 This philosophy becomes obvious when
contrasted with the robustness of jurisprudence in civil and political rights.75
Accordingly, I predict that rich jurisprudence on ESCRs developed regionally
and internationally would undoubtedly be a useful guide to judges in domestic
national courts.
At this juncture, three developments are relevant to mention. First, the
European Court of Human Rights adopted the Optional Protocol, which has
71
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE, supra note 68, at 66. See generally Slaughter, supra note
69; Mark V. Tushnet, The Possibilities of Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1226 (1999);
Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transjudicial Discourse, 2
INT’L J. CONST. L. 91 (2004); V.R. Krishna Iyer, Judge, Supreme Court of India, Inaugural
Address at the Second State Lawyers’ Conference (Jan. 3, 1976), available at
http://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/76v2a1.htm.
72
Iyer, supra note 71 (“Free India has to find its conscience in our rugged realities—and no
more in alien legal thought”).
73
Geraldine Van Bueren, Alleviating Poverty through the Constitutional Court, 15 S. AFR.
J. HUM. RTS. 74, 65–70 (1999). See also David Nelken, Disclosing/Invoking Legal Culture:
An Introduction, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUDIES 435, 440 (1995) (“We necessarily have the sense
of living in an interdependent global system marked by borrowing and lending across porous
cultural boundaries, and that Human Rights is one of the areas of law with the greatest ability
to travel.”).
74
Van Bueren, supra note 73, at 58. See generally Nelken, supra note 73.
75
Van Bueren, supra note 73, at 65. See generally Nelken, supra note 73.
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taken us one step closer to achieving an international forum for development of
ESCR jurisprudence. Although this process will take time, its potential should
not be disregarded.
Second, we are witnessing the slow emergence of ESCR jurisprudence in
regional human rights bodies—for instance, with the indirect protection
accorded to socio-economic rights by the European Courts of Human Rights.76
The merits of such indirect protection are topics for separate discussion. This
trend in regional human rights bodies relates to the socio-economic rights and
has contributed to the changed landscape.
Third, transnational judicial conversations are beginning to alter the
landscape of the judicial enforcement of ESCRs as applied by the judiciary in
countries throughout the world. For example, South African judges are
“empowered, although not obligated, to consider foreign law, which includes
foreign legal approaches, but where the provisions of the South African Bill of
Rights replicates Indian Constitutional provisions, the South African
Constitutional Court is under a greater duty to consider Indian
jurisprudence.”77 The reverse is also true. In the recent Indian case of Kuldip
Nayar v. Union of India,78 substantial engagement is seen with the reasoning of
the South African case of SACC New National Part of South Africa v.
Government of Republic of South Africa and Aeronautica Nazionale
Repubblicana,79 and the decision in United Democratic Movement v. President
of the Republic of South Africa.80
Does the phenomenon of transnational judicial conversations contribute to
strengthening the legitimacy of judicial involvement in ESCRs? The answer to
76

EVA BREMS, EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal Gross eds.,
2007).
77
Van Bueren, supra note 73, at 68. See also Nelken, supra note 73.
78
See, e.g., Nayar v. Union of India, 7 S.C.C. 1 (2006) (India).
79
See, e.g., SACC New National Party of South Africa v. Government of Republic of South
Africa and Aeronautica Nazionale Repubblicana 1999 (3) SA (CC) at 191 (S. Afr.).
80
See, e.g., United Democratic Movement v. President of the Republic of South Africa,
2003 (1) S.A. 495 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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this question could be “yes” because such a system will go some distance in
alleviating longstanding concerns that judges operate in a vacuum.81 For
example, this could be done by facilitating a system of exchange and sharing
of judicial expertise and skills, thereby ensuring that the judiciary is in fact
subject to external influences (i.e., the legal reasoning employed by other
courts in similar situations). Drawing on international and regional
jurisprudence might aid judges in their day-to-day affairs, lend legitimacy to
their decisions, and therefore generate greater acceptance of their decisions.
This argument might, however, also be viewed with suspicion. Can it truly
be external when this “conversation” remains within the judicial fraternity?82
Each country has its own judicial culture, and the influence from another
jurisdiction does in fact become external, which can prove to be a positive
practice in its neutralization of any inherent prejudices. Moreover, “the
jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts in other jurisdictions is a useful source
of guidance to any judge seeking to give meaning to a human rights
instrument.”83 Finally, so long as there are other methods and mechanisms in
place to facilitate representation of marginalized groups in decision making
and their participation, transnational judicial conversations can advance the
legitimacy of the courts in enforcement of ESCRs.
The preceding discussion demonstrates the entry of the phenomenon of
transnational judicial conversations into the domain of ESCRs, both indirectly
through regional jurisprudence and directly in constitutions. First, this has
altered the backdrop of the debate on justiciability of ESCRs. Second, it
answered the question of whether this trend can be used to strengthen the case
that ESCRs are not justiciable on grounds of capacity and legitimacy. Third,
the emergence of this phenomenon led to a changed role for judges in the
81
See Scott & Macklem, supra note 11, at 137 (describing this as “cold halls of an
institution far removed from the pulse of the nation.”).
82
See generally Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 499 (2000).
83
Lord Irvine of Lairg, Activism & Restraint: Human Rights and the Interpretive Process, 4
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 350, 355 (1999).
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enforcement of ESCRs. Finally, it can have a significant impact on the debate
of justiciability of ESCRs. This issue is important to consider in the context of
the judicial enforcement of ESCRs.
C. Institutional Dialogue84
The definition of “constitutional dialogue”85 advanced by Luc Trembley, a
scholar who has contributed to the development of the concept of
‘constitutional dialogue,’ embraces the proposition that this phenomenon can
be used to allay concerns over the legitimacy of judicial involvement.86 He
defines “institutional dialogue” as essentially a process whereby executives
and legislatures “participate in a dialogue aimed at achieving the proper
balance between constitutional principles and public policies and the existence
of this dialogue constitutes a good reason for not conceiving of judicial review
as democratically illegitimate.”87 To begin a debate on which organ of
government is superior to another is a futile exercise.88 If the criteria ought to
be election to office, the executive should be an equally autonomous sovereign
to Parliament; thereby defeating the notion of Parliamentary sovereignty.89 An
examination of government systems like the bicameral legislature of the
84

For the purposes of the present discussion, “constitutional dialogue” and “institutional
dialogue” are used interchangeably.
85
See Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell Thornton, Charter Dialogue between Courts
and Legislatures (or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All) 35
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 81 (1997). For other theories of institutional dialogue from the lens
of constitutionalism, see Kent Roach, Constitution and Common Law Dialogue Between the
Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CAN. BAR REV. 481 (2006); KENT ROACH,
THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (Irwin
Law ed., 2001); Kent Roach, Dialogue or Defiance: Legislative Reversals of Supreme Court
Decisions in Canada and the United States, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 347 (2006) (discussing the
merits for constitutional dialogue in situations where there are overriding and limitation
clauses in countries such as Canada, when compared to the United States, where this has not
been possible).
86
Luc B. Tremblay, Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue Between Courts
and Legislatures, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 617, 622–23 (2005).
87
Id. at 617. See Allan, Constitutional Dialogue, supra note 12.
88
See Allan, Constitutional Dialogue, supra note 12.
89
See id.

VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 2 • 2012

774 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

United Kingdom’s Parliament as one constituting an unelected House of Lords
disproves the idea of Parliament’s sovereignty because at least one section of
the British parliamentary system is not elected.90 Therefore, the real debate
should be about legitimacy and constitutional principles91 and not about which
organ of government is superior to another.
The United Kingdom demonstrates that parliamentary sovereignty can also
affront the rule of law and ultra vires. By being supreme and sovereign—and
therefore ‘above the law’—it violates the notion of rule of law where all
entities are considered subject to it. Furthermore, the critics of judicial review
who argue that it is an affront to the rule of law can be defeated by their own
argument.92 The debate on judicial review has not been focused on the issue of
legitimacy.93 Rather, the critics of ultra vires welcomed and praised the
contribution of the common law.94 Hence, common law stands as a testament
to the fact that judges do in fact make law. In the words of Lord Reid: “There
was a time when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that Judges make
law—they only declare it. Those with a taste for fairy tales seem to have
thought that in some Aladdin’s cave there is hidden the common law in all its
splendor and that on a judge’s appointment there descends on him knowledge
of the magic words Open Sesame. . . . But we do not believe in fairy tales
anymore.”95
The concept of dialogue, as suggested by Allan, has been subject to
skepticism.96 Judicial responsibility, Tremblay97 argues, requires judges to be
90

See id.
See id.
92
See id.
93
See id.
94
See id.
95
Lord Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker, 12 J. SOC’Y PUB. TEACHERS L. 22, 22 (1972);
H.W.R. WADE, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS 78 (1989) (“[J]udges are up to their
necks in policy, as they have been all through history”); Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban
District Council, 1 QB 373, 391 (1972) (“In the end, it will be found to be a question of
policy, which we, as judges, have to decide.”).
96
Tremblay, supra note 86, at 622–23 (arguing that the type of dialogue described as
granting legitimacy to judicial review “does not and cannot exist,” though he recognizes that
91
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loyal to their decisions and willing to justify them through concrete
reasoning.98 He claims that this is incompatible with the formulation of the
“dialogue as deliberation” model, which calls for flexibility on the part of
judges even to the point of being willing to change their position on a matter.99
He declares that judges must not “subordinate their own convictions and
practical judgments to the will or judgments of others.”100 Can we argue that
the “dialogue as deliberation” model advocates rational persuasion and not
coercion? Can we not contend that when a judge begins to retreat from a
previously held position through genuine agreement and conviction, it is not
“subordination”? Should not the “supremacy of reason”101 be the ultimate
winner in such a situation? When a judge’s original view has been displaced
willingly and voluntarily by another view, is it subordination? Perhaps it is
possible that the argument of incompatibility has discrepancies. Perhaps
Tremblay’s charge of incompatibility becomes relevant only in a situation
where a judge is forced to change his or her mind against his or her will.
Nevertheless, requiring judges to not change their minds is to assume that
judges are the best decision makers.102 Tremblay takes the argument one step
further by construing “justification” by the judiciary of their decisions as a
there is some dialogue taking place). Tremblay introduces two definitions of dialogue,
namely, “dialogue as deliberation” and “dialogue as conversation.” He argues that the former
is the type that would be successful in lending legitimacy to judicial review. He claims,
however, that this model is not compatible with the notion of judicial responsibility, which
he argues is inextricably linked with the rule of law and essence of judicial function. Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 635.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 634.
101
Trevor R.S. Allan, Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of ‘Due Deference’, 65
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 671, 694 (2006) (“A ‘legal culture of justification’ demands the supremacy
of reason; and reason is persuasive argument, closely tailored to the circumstances of the
particular case in question.”) [hereinafter Allan, Human Rights].
102
See generally Richard Ekins, Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law, 119 L.Q. REV. 127
(2003) (demonstrating how the judicial function is better for interpreting rather than making
the law).
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means of making the judiciary “subordinate” to the legislature.103 However,
this is a dangerous proposition to make since it might allow judges to operate
in a vacuum and not be held accountable to the legislature. Ultimately, this
result runs counter to the purpose of the judicial role because it would threaten
the legitimacy of the judicial function.104
The preceding discussion illustrates the fact that the concept of institutional
dialogue brings legitimacy to the judicial enterprise. It also demonstrates how
it can counter the claim that judicial enforcement of ESCRs violates the
doctrine of separation of powers by arguing for a balance of power, rather than
the traditional notion of a strict separation of powers.105 Therefore, it is not true
that it lacks legitimacy. The notion of “institutional dialogue” considered by
Allan suggests a changed role for the judiciary.106 He proposes a role defined
less as one where the judiciary merely fills legal spaces or gaps, but rather as
one that takes on a more positive flavor based on the notion of “shared
sovereignty”107 in a “more formal sense”108 where “authority is divided.”109
Hence, under this perspective, the role of the court is one that ought to be more
than simply picking up the missing pieces to finish off the work of the
legislature. It suggests a far more proactive and meaningful presence for the
103

Tremblay, supra note 86, at 634–35.
Allan, Human Rights, supra note 101, at 695 (“By forestalling or curtailing such
argument, a doctrine of deference threatens to displace law and reason, strictly applied, by
expediency and arbitrariness.”).
105
Allan, Constitutional Dialogue, supra note 12, at 563 (“There must be a balance of power
between law-giver and interpreter, maintained by judgments of political morality rather than
formal accounts of the separation of powers.”); Pieterse, supra note 11, at 404 (arguing that
inter alia, in the wake of the new formulation for the doctrine of separation of powers
envisaged by the South African Bill of Rights together with the prevalence of a diluted or
different conception of democracy, it would be counterproductive to keep lamenting this fact
by pretending that it is still threatening); see also Part 1; Allan, Human Rights, supra note
101.
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Allan, Constitutional Dialogue, supra note 12, at 563.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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judiciary; one which the judiciary has shown to be capable of sustaining. This
perspective calls for a reconceptualization of the judicial role.
D. Final Thoughts
The second part of the article sought to advance the argument of a “changed
landscape” that has confronted the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs by
identifying prevalent phenomena, which are on the rise in several different
regions of the world. The set of phenomena explored in this chapter is not
intended to be an exhaustive list.110 Instead, the three examples provided
directly and substantially bear on the debate. This section demonstrates how
these phenomena go to the heart of the debate on the judicial role. Moreover,
these debates are predicted to escalate and should by no means be ignored.
Further, although each has a significant bearing on the debate, the
interaction and close interplay will likely impact the context of the judicial
enforcement of ESCRs such that the effect of the sum is greater than its parts.
This part of the article served two primary purposes. First, it further weakened
the skeptics’ case. Secondly, it demonstrated that the changed context for the
judicial enforcement of ESCRs is a reality that has resulted in the need for
reconsideration of the judicial role.
110

There was a renewed interest and momentum in the establishment of freedom from
poverty as a human right, as evidenced by the development of the Legal Empowerment of
the Poor (LEP) approach to dealing with poverty and further the setting up of the Committee
on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP) in 2005. See Dan Banik, Legal
Empowerment as a Conceptual and Operational Tool in Poverty Eradiction, 1 HAGUE J.
RULE L. 117, 117 (2009). See, e.g., Matthew Stephens, The Commission on Legal
Empowerment of the Poor: An Opportunity Missed, 1 HAGUE J. RULE L. 132, (2009). See
also Stephen Golub, The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: One Big Step
Forward and A Few Steps Back for Development Policy and Practice, 1 HAGUE J. RULE L.
101 (2009); LAW AND POVERTY: THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND POVERTY REDUCTION (Lucy
Williams et al. eds., 2004). Yet another factor that might be seen as contributing to the
changed landscape to the debate on justiciability of ESCR is the adoption of the Optional
Protocol and the potential impact it has on the justiciability debate if and when it is
instituted. See Part 1.
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II. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE JUDICIAL ROLE
This section examines the role that the judiciary plays in the wake of the
proposed “changed landscape” that emerged as a result of the weakened
skepticism in the justiciable nature of ESCRs and the corresponding “rise” of
phenomena. This discussion addresses the inherent limitations in such a
judicial role. The aim of this part of the article, however, is not to focus on the
shortcomings of the judiciary, but rather to demonstrate how the judiciary can
in fact contribute to the implementation of ESCRs.
Several aspects of the United Nations’ framework governing judicial
conduct reinforces arguments advanced in parts 1 and 2 of this article while at
the same time rendering direct legitimacy to judicial involvement in the
domain of enforcing ESCRs. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of
2006 recalled the need for member states “to achieve international cooperation
in promoting and encouraging human rights and fundamental ‘principles.’”111
The development of the trend of transnational judicial conversations112 gains
legitimacy from this provision of the ECOSOC by arguing that it facilitates
meeting the requirement of “international cooperation” in the field of human
rights adjudication by setting in motion avenues for the sharing of mutually
enriching bodies of jurisprudence. Thus, in addition to the legitimacy derived
from national constitutions—such as the South African constitution—this
principle of judicial conduct might also be used to justify and legitimize a
judge’s substantive engagement with relevant international human rights
jurisprudence.
Moreover, the ECOSOC upholds “the importance of a competent”113
judiciary. The ECOSOC’s conclusions reinforce the need for competence in
matters under adjudication that go so far as to require judges not only “to
111

U.N. Economic & Social Council, Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct:
Strengthening the Principles of Judicial Conduct (2006), available at
http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/documents/2006/resolutions/Resolution%202006-23.pdf
(emphasis added).
112
See Part 2.
113
U.N. Economic & Social Council, supra note 111.
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maintain and enhance . . . knowledge, skills, and personal qualities necessary
for the proper performance of judicial duties,”114 but also to be “subject to
suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity . . . that render them unfit
to discharge their duties.”115
The ECOSOC also recognizes that “judges are accountable for their conduct
to appropriate institutions established to maintain judicial standards which are
themselves independent and impartial.”116 This recognition allays the concern
that judges are free from any accountability,117 although the lack of the
“public” dimension of accountability might remain contested.
These provisions have value in that they create international standards for
the government of the judiciary. However, while these standards have general
applicability, it must be borne in mind that it is neither desirable nor feasible to
have a single “formula” or a “one-size-fits-all” approach for the judicial role;
to do so would negate the varying legal and political realities of each
country.118 Thus, it is useful to consider the problems any country envisaging
the “constitutionalization” of ESCRs and the consequent protection by the
judiciary would need to address because there is a core set of factors that
would need to be addressed in any context.119
The following section attempts to carve out a judicial role in relation to
ESCRs. It will embrace a three-pronged approach to examine the function of
the judiciary in three areas where it is most active and most contested: namely,
interpreting the meaning of ESCRs, judicial review of executive action, and
the provision of remedies.
114

Id.
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Basic Principles on
Independence of the Judiciary (1985), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/indjudiciary.htm.
116
U.N. Economic & Social Council, supra note 114.
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A. Interpreting the Meaning of ESCRs
Fabre, an international commentator who has addressed the constitutional
dimensions of social rights comprehensively, argues that the ESCR trainings
prescribed for judges are deficient in that they only present a “piecemeal”120
perspective on the execution of social rights and do not embrace the holistic
view of a government’s duty, which is essential to this function of
interpretation.121 This argument, though reasonable, does not seem to take into
account the merits of effecting “constitutional dialogue” between the three
organs of government.122 Though such dialogue might not completely assuage
this concern, it provides some clarity as to what the executive intends by
facilitating a cooperative relationship between the three organs of democratic
government.
Fabre’s second argument holds more ground; he laments the “reactive”
nature of adjudication whereby the government performs its duty only after a
case is brought to court and “once harm is [already] done.”123 This concern
might also be refuted through the practice of “judicial preview”124: where the
laws are assessed for congruence with principles of legality, legitimacy, and
natural justice prior to implementation; where the Constitutional Court issues
decisions that will be applicable to the entire group or individuals falling
within the ambit of the particular law in question, as opposed to consideration
of implications of the law for the one individual case before it.125 Fabre
observes, however, that the system of judicial preview ensures that government
policy is not over-simplified by consideration through the perspective of one
individual case only, but rather engages in a holistic manner as is intended by
120

Id.
Id.
122
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Separation of Powers, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1066 (1996); Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur.
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the original intent of the government policy.126 Additionally, the concept of
judicial preview does not address the situation where incompatibility of law
with constitutional provisions is seen only after the violation.127 Thus, a
possible solution would be to allow both systems, namely, judicial review,
which is the judicial capacity to review the soundness of lower court decisions,
and judicial preview, to be at the disposal of the judiciary and to be utilized
depending on the nature of the case before the court.
Similarly, the proactive approach taken by courts such as the Supreme Court
of India has helped meet some of the shortfalls of excluding victims who
remain anonymous to a court. Moreover, it has changed the model of Public
Interest Litigation (PIL), which is litigation in protection of the public that is
introduced in a court of law by the court itself or by a third party; it is not
necessary that the victim of the violation personally approach the court.128
However, scholars like David Bilchitz129 and Rosalind Dixon130 defend and
even advocate a role for judges in filling in “blind spots”131 of law in order to
better protect the interests of minorities and unseen members of a society. It is
important, however, for the judiciary to ground its decisions in legitimate legal
ideals, otherwise it may face abstraction and ultimate collapse.132
This would best be highlighted if we imagine a judiciary in the United States
that decided to stop working inside the framework of the US Constitution.
Consider a situation where the courts no longer looked to legitimate legal
126
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principles such as the US Constitution in determining their cases. Without this
framework of legitimacy, the court would face constant criticism and
invalidation, and eventually collapse. Several judicial models133 of
interpretation, such as those of “reasonableness,” “dignity-equality-freedom,”
and “equality,” have been devised as tools to aid judges in defining the scope
and ambit for ESCRs.134 The ultimate goal is to create a model that facilitates a
socially transformative judicial role that is also legitimatized through
practically application. The models discussed above highlight the way in
which the courts are capable of ingenuity and creativity despite debate over the
best method to reach this goal.
The judiciary’s role in the enforcement of norms is clearly compatible with
its traditional function and still subject to the same methods of accountability.
The International Commission of Jurists is explicit about the judges’
interpretative role in ESCRs: “In cases when different legal interpretations are
possible, . . . assigning judges a role in the enforcement of these norms is
absolutely compatible with the traditional function performed by the
judiciary.”135 However, giving courts the right to be the final authority on the
scope and ambit of rights136 is not to say that their powers are unfettered.
Frameworks of judicial conduct that limit unfettered judicial discretion in
carrying out this function have been laid down and need to be looked upon
133
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fairly.137 These frameworks maintain the legitimacy of the judiciary’s
interpretations and conduct.
A more tempered view is that judges should be seen only as contributing
to—and not enjoying—the sole prerogative in this interpretative duty. The
judiciary’s duty should be one of “assisting other branches of government.”138
Through this approach, a spirit of “inter-institutional cooperative
interaction”139 could be built without losing sight of the court’s duty to
promote “human dignity, [equality] and freedom” through rights
adjudication.140
B. Judicial Review
Part of the court’s interpretative role is the duty of review that arises when a
party alleges non-compliance by the state. This alleged non-compliance often
involves violation of ESCRs through the state’s actions in a case brought
before the court. The more judicial review is restrained and restricted through
high burdens of proof or limited access for those whose ESCRs are violated,
the more there are concerns about judicial incapacity and lack of legitimacy.141
All that judges can do in a restrained judicial system is to make a
determination as to whether standards in the constitution are adhered to in
formulating budgets.142 The original decision on making budgets is left to the
elected organs of government.143 Therefore, it is arguable that merely because
cases like Minister of Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)
“may have budgetary implications, . . . courts are not themselves directed at
137
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rearranging budgets.”144 As writers like Pieterse, an author of leading works on
ESCRs, observe, “the fact is that courts are not ill equipped to scrutinize or
evaluate budgets or policies just because they are ill equipped to engage in
budgetary or policy making.”145 In order to make such determinations, courts
and elected bodies ought to formulate criteria for making judgments on
budgetary issues.146 This will undoubtedly lend legitimacy to their verdicts on
ESCR matters.
Judicial review is justified on the grounds that judicial review is justified on
the grounds of being valuable in terms of remedying violations of rights that
are a consequence of undesirable governmental policy-making. It is by no
means intended to displace and replace government policy making with
judicial policy making.147 Further, the concept of “constitutional dialogue”
could serve as a “middle ground” and is often used as a justification for
legitimizing judicial review.148 Writers like Tushnet, a writer on the concepts
of judicial review and preview as well as judicial systems generally, also
support “weak-form review,”149 as it prevents the judiciary from encroaching
into the policy-making domain of the elected branches of government.150
I argue that “weak-form review” is the recommended approach for all types
of rights since it acknowledges and balances two important factors: the
vaguely defined right, on the other hand, is balanced with the judiciary’s
construction of what the right ought to be, on the other.151 However, one must
remember that this form of review is not always easy to sustain because it has
the attendant danger of swinging to either extreme: where judges begin to
144
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make policy decisions through “strong form”152 judicial review, or where
elected officials do not acknowledge the judicial role in such matters.153 The
danger of a “slip down either side of the slope” could be mitigated by having
the judiciary sensitized to such dangers, thereby raising awareness on the
rightful limitations inherent in its role.
C. Provision of Remedies
There is no history or legacy of awarding remedies for violations of ESCRs.
Some contend that it is in the awarding of remedies that the judiciary becomes
most vulnerable to overstepping its mark.154
In South Africa, for example, courts are empowered with a broad mandate
to award remedies.155 Section 38 of the South African Constitution (regarding
the duty to provide “appropriate relief”) and Section 172(1)(b) (allowing the
judiciary to “make any order that is just and equitable”) indicate considerable
space for judicial discretion and innovation in the area of providing
remedies.156
The terms “appropriate” and “just and equitable” are inherently ambiguous.
While tradition has granted the South African courts broad award powers, the
language itself could be read either way. These words may be said to provide a
framework within which decisions are to be made, and thus constrain judicial
decision-making. However, as notions of “appropriateness” and “just and
equitable” are all subjective, relative terms, judges do indeed have a broad
“margin of appreciation” in making such decisions.
Some controversy has existed regarding whether or not the judiciary should
provide for “building an enforcement mechanism into the remedy awarded.”157
Indeed, as the South African case of Government of the Republic of South
152
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Africa v. Grootboom158 demonstrates, the court’s opinion once again goes to
the heart of balancing interests of legal legitimacy with interests of
effectiveness in enforcing ESCRs.
Commentators in the justiciability of ESCRs such as scholar and
commentator Marius Pieterse suggest further guidelines for judicial activity in
this area. He argues for facilitating “inter-institutional interaction”159 through
respecting the doctrine of separation of powers and designing creative
remedies only in instances where traditional ones are ineffective.160 He argues
that the remedies must be designed in such a way that they do not have farreaching implications on parties unconnected to a case.161
A possible means of allowing a judicial role in this area while not
encroaching on the mandate of the other organs of the state would be to send
the statute back to the legislature for amendment, as in cases such as
Grootboom.162 Writers like Bilchitz, a landmark scholar in the field of human
rights protection and promotion, opt for rigorous review of what the right
should entail and how speedily the right ought to be enforced and
implemented.163 Conversely, Mureinik, a commentator in the field of human
rights protection, argues that the standard of review by judges should be
rational and sincere consideration before a court can send a statute back. A
combination of both would be useful to the judges’ decision-making processes
as each case might embrace a different set of realities.
Bilchitz goes one step further in envisaging a situation where a verdict
declaring no shortage of resources together with a lack of competing claims on
158
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the same resources grants the judiciary the power to coerce the government to
execute its duties.164 While it is tempting to employ such an approach as a
means to protect citizens in the event of either arbitrary action or inaction by
oppressive governments,165 it becomes problematic because it rests on the
assumption that the judiciary is in the best position to make assessments on
competing claims of resource allocations. Further, it carries with it an
imminent danger of a situation where the judiciary is overseeing and dictating
government’s day-to-day spending plans. Moreover, there is also the concern
that the judiciary does not have a holistic view, but rather a “piecemeal”
impression of government policy.166 It is in situations such as this that a
healthy relationship of “constitutional dialogue” and understanding between
the executive and judiciary becomes imperative.167
The other situation to be considered is one where it is pronounced by the
judiciary that the government has been erroneous in the apportioning of its
resources. Here too, a budget might be sent back to the government for
corrective action.168 While the arguments raised in part two are relevant here as
well, assuming that such concerns are allayed,169 such an approach would not
violate the doctrine of separation of powers so long as the details are left to be
worked out by the organs generally responsible for budgetary decisions. This is
an example of a situation where “weak-form” review becomes attractive.
A useful approach for protecting the judiciary from sliding down the
“slippery slope” toward policy making would be to mete out the requirement
of having to stop at the point of a pronouncement of violation of the ESCR of
the individual rather than merely providing reasons for what led them to arrive
164
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at this decision.170 This approach would prevent the judiciary from being
perceived as making veiled references to corrective action that the judiciary
believes should be taken by the executive.
Similarly, in the broader discussion on meaningful contributions of the
judiciary in enforcing ESCRs it must be borne in mind that there are a range of
factors171 that need to be considered. These include access to courts by
marginalized and vulnerable groups and individuals, responsiveness of the
courts to ESCR violations in general, and new situations where ESCRs are
violated—in particular the implementation of court orders, and the response to
orders by the larger public.172
D. Final Thoughts
Taking a moment to step back and observe the broader debate on what the
approach of the judiciary has been,173 it is clear that the notion of what it ought
to be174 is ripe for further discussion. Opinion is divided on which judicial
approach is the most appropriate. One view is that the judiciary has been
activist to a fault, while others argue that the judiciary has been too deferential
170
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to other governmental bodies.175 Yet another view is that a reasonable and
balanced judicial approach is advisable; namely, one that is effective and
makes a valuable contribution to the overall implementation of ESCRs.
It appears, then, that the judiciary should be activist to the extent that it
remains within the boundaries of its legitimacy and capability while at the
same time being conscious of maintaining an effective presence in the overall
implementation of ESCRs. Conversely, perhaps the judiciary should remain
deferential to the extent that is required for it to maintain its legitimacy within
the domain of its capability while not losing sight of contributing to the
implementation of ESCRs. In other words, the judiciary should be activist
enough to be effective and deferential enough not to raise concerns of
legitimacy and capacity.

CONCLUSION
The rise of judicially enforced ESCRs has raised new questions in the
discussion of justiciability. However, as this article has shown, this is not to
say that the original questions have been displaced and are henceforth
irrelevant. Rather, it has revealed that the original questions require revisiting,
but this time with a refocused lens necessitated by new developments that have
a significant bearing on the original questions.
175
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The article began with an examination of the question as to whether and to
what extent the debate on the justiciability of ESCRs has been settled. Through
a detailed examination of two of the more important objections leveled against
the justiciability of ESCRs, this article exposed the weaknesses in the skeptics’
case. Furthermore, their case is weakened where judicial involvement is shown
to have derived renewed strength from new constitutional conceptions of the
separation of powers, new understandings of the notion of democracy, the
practice of institutional dialogue between the judiciary and its elected
counterparts, and finally, through the growing recourse to transnational judicial
conversations.176
This article has demonstrated that analogous to the rise of judicially
enforced ESCRs, there has been a corresponding “rise” in new phenomena as
presented in part two, which has changed the landscape within which the role
of the judiciary has hitherto been located.
Further, the article demonstrated in part three that this “changed landscape”
has necessitated a reconsideration of the role of the judiciary. The
reconceptualization of the judicial role has been carried out in the context of
realizing the larger goal of contributing to the overall implementation of
ESCRs.
The article acknowledges the importance of the “dependent variables”177 in
ensuring the overall effectiveness of the judicial role and though it has not
been the subject of analysis in the present article, it must be flagged in view of
its importance.
Further study is needed into the intersectionality between the effectiveness
of the judicial role and the dependent variables, with the aim of reducing this
dependency. This need for further study is important in order to improve the
perception of the potential contribution of the judiciary and to avoid situations
where it might be used as an excuse for ineffectiveness or inertia on the part of
176
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the judiciary. Further study would help to demonstrate how the judicial role
can be effective without being dependent on the success and interaction of the
dependent variables, and how the judicial role is not contingent or conditioned
on these dependent variables for its success. Instead, we should find a way of
ensuring success of the role of dependent variables independently of external
factors not within the courts’ control.
Furthermore, the underlying suggestion of this article has been that
successful enforcement of ESCRs does not automatically translate into a
process of social transformation.178 There has been a slow emergence of
academic thought and literature on the potential of courts in the area of social
transformation. This also could be an area that is worthy of further exploration,
albeit carefully.179 The reason for this caution is because the judiciary should
not run the risk of spreading its effectiveness and contribution too thin so as to
threaten its already secured role in the enforcement of ESCRs.
Moreover, further research into the effect that the new set of phenomena
herein described has on the ESCRs will be welcome in deepening our
understanding. This is especially the case because some of these areas are new
even in understanding their own conceptualization and functioning.
Finally, the role of the judiciary should always remain effective in whatever
it is conceived of as being legitimate and capable of doing. The judiciary
should retain and build on its role in enforcing ESCRs. As long as this is
achieved, it will keep the hopes of millions of vulnerable and marginalized
communities and individuals the world over alive.
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